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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
Two cases are before us. Case No. 99-5662 is a petition 
for review of a July 29, 1999 order (the "July 29 Order" or 
"Order") issued by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (the "EPA") to W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace") 
pursuant to the emergency provisions of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act ("SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. S 300i(a). Case No. 00-3302 
is also a petition for review, this time of a Statement of 
Work Grace was required to submit under the EPA's July 
29 Order. The petitions were consolidated by order of this 
Court on July 6, 2000. For the reasons noted below, we 
vacate and remand the EPA's July 29 Order. Thus we need 
not address the issues raised in the second petition for 
review. 
 
I. Background Facts 
 
This case involves a water supply hazard at the Dye 
Water Conditioning Plant (the "Dye Plant" or"Plant") in 
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Lansing, Michigan. The Dye Plant is one of two water 
treatment plants owned and operated by the Lansing Board 
of Water & Light (the "Lansing Board" or "LBW&L") that 
supplies drinking water to the City of Lansing. The Dye 
Plant is designed to operate and treat groundwater 
("influent" water) through a disinfection process known as 
"chloramination," in which ammonia and chlorine are 
added to the water to form chloramines that inactivate 
bacteria. 
 
A plume of ammonia originating at a fertilizer plant 
owned by Grace entered the Saginaw aquifer from which 
the Dye Plant draws its water. The ammonia traveled from 
a smaller aquifer located below the Motor Wheel Disposal 
Site (but above the Saginaw aquifer) where Grace and other 
local industries disposed of wastes from their respective 
plants. On June 10, 1986, the Motor Wheel Disposal Site 
was placed on a list of hazardous waste sites to be cleaned 
up pursuant to section 105 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. S 9605. Grace joined with Goodyear, 
Textron, and the Lansing Board in several agreements to 
engage in long-term study and cleanup of a wide range of 
chemicals at the Motor Wheel Disposal Site pursuant to 
CERCLA. However, no agreement was made among these 
parties to engage in a CERCLA cleanup of the Saginaw 
aquifer that had become contaminated with excess 
ammonia originating from the Motor Wheel Disposal Site. 
 
In 1997, the Lansing Board became increasingly 
concerned about the danger posed by the ammonia plume 
to its Dye Plant wells located closest to the Motor Wheel 
Disposal Site. As a precautionary measure, the Lansing 
Board removed from service ten drinking water wells 
located closest to the ammonia plume. The loss of these 
wells constituted approximately 12% of the Dye Plant's total 
capacity. Both parties acknowledge that the Lansing Board 
is able to meet its current drinking water production 
demands without these ten wells. However, the Lansing 
Board claims that it may need to replace this lost 
production capacity in the event of a severe drought or the 
loss of further wells to contamination from the ammonia 
plume. As of the date of oral argument in this case, the 
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Lansing Board was monitoring twenty-two drinking water 
wells for possible ammonia contamination. 
 
On May 4, 1998, the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality notified the Safe Drinking Water 
Branch of the EPA of its concern that excess ammonia 
influent to the Dye Plant would cause nitrification that 
could compromise the Lansing public's health. The 
Michigan Department acknowledged that there was"no 
existing State or Federal Maximum Contaminant Level for 
ammonia, and no corresponding health effects information 
for ammonia."1 Nonetheless, it expressed concern that the 
ammonia level permitted at the Motor Wheel Disposal Site 
-- 34 milligrams per liter ("mg/l") -- was a "taste and odor 
level set for aesthetics only" that would not prevent 
leaching of ammonia into the Saginaw aquifer at levels that 
could cause excess nitrification at the Dye Plant. It 
therefore referred the problem to the EPA's Safe Drinking 
Water Branch to consider approaches for cleanup of the 
Saginaw aquifer with a "stricter clean-up level (stricter than 
34 mg/l) for ammonia" pursuant to CERCLA. In a 
memorandum dated October 5, 1998, the Safe Drinking 
Water Branch concurred in the Michigan Department's view 
that excess ammonia could lead to excess nitrification and 
microbial growth that could cause noncompliance with a 
number of Federal and State regulations and pose a threat 
to the public's health. The Safe Drinking Water Branch 
concluded that the 34 mg/l standard would be insufficient 
to protect the Lansing public drinking water system and 
that an appropriate ammonia cleanup standard should be 
set at 1.75 mg/l. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The EPA has issued a "lifetime health advisory" of 30 milligrams per 
liter. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water 
Standards and Health Advisories, Summer 2000, at 8. A health advisory 
is an "estimate of acceptable drinking water levels for a chemical 
substance based on health effects information." It is "not a legally 
enforceable Federal standard, but serves as a technical guidance to 
assist Federal, state, and local officials." Id. at iii. A lifetime health 
advisory provides "[t]he concentration of a chemical in drinking water 
that is not expected to cause any adverse noncarcinogenic effects for a 
lifetime of exposure." Id. at iv. 
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In a report dated January 20, 1999, an outside 
consultant hired by the Lansing Board concluded that 
excess ammonia at the Dye Plant would encourage bacteria 
growth and increase problems with excess chloramines, 
nitrates, nitrites, lead, and copper, all of which may 
threaten the public's health. The report attacked the 34 
mg/l standard used to clean up the Motor Wheel Disposal 
Site and urged that a stricter standard be used with respect 
to the Saginaw aquifer because "[a]ny amount of excess 
ammonia over existing background levels (0.1-0.5 mg/l 
ammonia as nitrogen) will impact the current treatment 
and operational practices at the Dye [Plant]." The report 
further noted that if the influent ammonia levels were not 
kept low or within narrow limits, new processes would have 
to be developed at the Dye Plant to remove the ammonia 
completely. These processes would add complexity to the 
Plant operations, require capital expenditures, and increase 
operations and maintenance costs. 
 
The Safe Drinking Water Branch later amended its 
October 5, 1998 memorandum recommending an ammonia 
cleanup standard for the Saginaw aquifer. It stated that in 
light of information obtained from meeting with the Lansing 
Board's consultant and a review of its report, the Safe 
Drinking Water Branch would revise its recommendation 
for the ammonia cleanup standard from 1.75 mg/l to the 
more stringent standard of 0.5 mg/l. That cleanup 
standard was subsequently incorporated into an emergency 
order issued by the EPA on February 26, 1999, requiring 
that Grace alone reduce the ammonia levels in the Saginaw 
aquifer to background levels (about 0.5 mg/l) and replace 
the drinking water capacity lost by the Lansing Board from 
shutting down ten of its drinking water wells. 
 
In response to the EPA's order, Grace proposed forming 
a technical committee of all interested parties to review the 
issues and evaluate cooperatively the available options for 
protecting the operations of the Dye Plant. On April 12, 
1999, the EPA agreed to withdraw its first order and to 
issue a new order based upon the findings of the newly- 
formed Saginaw Aquifer Technical Evaluation Team 
("SATET"), which would include technical representatives 
from Grace, the EPA, the Lansing Board, and the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality. 
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SATET was empaneled to evaluate four approaches to 
protect the public from the health hazards associated with 
excess ammonia in the Saginaw aquifer. SATET's mission 
statement listed those approaches as follows: 
 
       Approach 1- "Control of Saginaw Aqui fer ground- 
       water ammonia-nitrogen contamination 
       incident to potentially impacted BW&L 
       wells by pump and treat measures." 
 
       Approach 2- "Limitation of influent ammonia-nitrogen 
       at the Dye Water Conditioning Plant 
       (WCP) to approximately 1 mg/l 
       (plus/minus approximately 0.2 mg/l), 
       including via measures arising from 
       Option 1 above. This may also involve a 
       well field management program, 
       including routine monitoring and 
       characterization of the water produced 
       from specific BW&L wells." 
 
       Approach 3- "Wellhead treatment of impac ted LBW&L 
       wells (either individually or combined, 
       i.e. intermediate treatment), by ammonia 
       control technology." 
 
       Approach 4- "Supplemental treatment at t he LBW&L 
       Dye WCP for ammonia control." 
 
In less technical terms, the four approaches can be 
summarized as follows. Under Approach 1, water is 
pumped from the Saginaw aquifer in an attempt to 
"capture" the ammonia plume and remove it from the water 
before it affects the Lansing Board's wells. Approach 2 
contains two alternative methods for keeping ammonia 
concentrations below 1.0 mg/l and preventing spikes in 
excess of 0.2 mg/l. The first alternative, known as 
"blending," involves reordering the sequence in which wells 
are turned on so that water from wells with higher levels of 
ammonia may be blended with water from wells with low 
ammonia concentrations. The second alternative involves 
shutting down wells affected by elevated ammonia 
("mothballing") and replacing them with newly drilled wells 
of similar or greater capacity ("well-replacement"). Approach 
3 involves treatment technologies known as ion exchange, 
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breakpoint chlorination, and air stripping. These could be 
applied at individual wells or groups of wells to treat 
ammonia before the water is pumped to the Dye Plant. 
Approach 4 involves applying these same treatment 
processes at the Dye Plant to reduce or eliminate ammonia 
in the influent water already at the Plant. 
 
On May 14, 1999, SATET produced a draft report 
evaluating the four approaches to protect the public from 
ammonia contamination in the Saginaw aquifer. In its 
discussion of Approach 1, SATET's draft report 
recommended that a program of data collection, including 
new monitoring wells, and groundwater modeling be 
conducted with the goal of confirming capture of the 
ammonia plume in the Saginaw aquifer. If capture could 
not be confirmed, the data would be used to decide where 
additional extraction wells would be needed. The report 
acknowledged that new extraction wells might take as long 
as two years to be installed and become operational. In the 
meantime, SATET recommended considering other options 
to protect the Lansing Board's capability of producing water 
in sufficient quantity for its customers, which would be the 
thrust of Approaches 2, 3, and 4. 
 
In its discussion of Approach 2, SATET's draft report 
stated that blending could "help mitigate" an operational 
problem at the Plant, but that making decisions on which 
wells to operate could be complicated, and accurate 
prediction of the resulting ammonia concentration would 
require continuous monitoring of incoming ammonia 
concentrations both at the well head and at the Plant. The 
draft report concluded that mothballing of selected wells 
with elevated ammonia levels would remove them from the 
well sequence and any effect on the water supply, but 
might not prevent contaminants from migrating to the next 
tier of wells in the field. The report therefore recommended 
that mothballed wells be replaced with new wells in a new 
location far from potential contamination. The influent from 
the new wells would keep ammonia concentrations low and 
could be used effectively in an altered well sequence to 
dampen ammonia spikes. Finally, the draft report 
recommended that the Lansing Board refrain from pumping 
the wells that it had shut down in 1997 and that it begin 
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regular monitoring of all wells to confirm that ammonia 
concentrations would not rise to levels that would cause 
concern. 
 
The draft report indicated that Approaches 3 and 4 might 
be effective, but noted limitations if Approach 4 were used 
to treat ammonia concentrations greater than 1.0 mg/l. The 
report also expressed the Lansing Board's opposition to 
Approaches 3 and 4 because of public perceptions about 
the quality of source water. Ultimately, the draft report 
concluded that the data did not indicate a need for 
Approaches 3 or 4 in the near future. 
 
On May 21, 1999, SATET issued a final report 
recommending that Approach 1 be adopted to protect the 
Dye Plant and that Approaches 2, 3, and 4 be applied as 
supplements to Approach 1. SATET concluded that 
 
       [t]he ultimate resolution of the Cooperating Parties['] 
       concerns regarding the Saginaw Aquifer and LBW&L 
       operations lies in remediation of the Saginaw Aquifer. 
       While aquifer remediation is proceeding, in the short 
       term, other options can be considered to protect the 
       LBW&L capability to produce safe water in sufficient 
       quantity for its customers. This is the thrust of 
       Approaches 2, 3, and 4. Each of these approaches 
       would be supplements to the treatment options 
       discussed in Approach 1. 
 
The final report differed from the draft report by adding the 
following concerns about Approach 2. It explained that 
blending would allow contaminants to enter a drinking 
water system and that the "LBW&L staff stated that the 
knowing acceptance of contaminants, however diluted, in 
the drinking water transmission system, would be 
unacceptable, and would not be recommended to LBW&L 
top management or Board of Commissioners." The report 
further explained that the "LBW&L staff stated that 
mothballing with replacement wells, in conjunction with 
Approach 1 (plume containment and capture and treatment 
of contaminated water from extraction wells) would likely be 
recommended to LBW&L top management and Board of 
Commissioners." In addition, the report noted that, in order 
to avoid complicated control requirements associated with 
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a blending approach, "cleanup of [the] aquifer is essential," 
and that "[r]emoval of ammonia from the well field before it 
impacts any production wells, as discussed in Approach 1, 
may be preferable to the complex operational changes 
required to manage incoming ammonia concentrations." 
 
The parties dispute whether Grace concurred in SATET's 
final recommendation for implementation of Approach 1. 
The EPA maintains that SATET's recommendation was 
unanimous and included Grace's approval. However, in a 
July 7, 1999 memorandum from Grace's counsel to William 
E. Muno, the Director of the EPA's Superfund Division, 
Grace concurred in SATET's recommendation for 
Approaches 1 and 2, but reserved an objection to the 
implementation of Approach 1 pursuant to the emergency 
provisions of SDWA rather than the EPA's long-term 
cleanup powers under CERCLA. 
 
In any event, the EPA issued a second emergency order 
-- the July 29 Order -- purportedly based upon SATET's 
findings and recommendations. The July 29 Order requires 
that Grace engage in a long-term cleanup of the Saginaw 
aquifer by installing, by January 1, 2003, extraction wells 
or equivalent technology that will reduce ammonia levels in 
the capture zone of the drinking water wells to 1.2 mg/l. 
Although the Order does not explicitly say, this mandate 
appears to require that Grace use Approach 1 to perform 
the long-term cleanup of the Saginaw aquifer. In addition to 
long-term cleanup, the July 29 Order requires that Grace 
take immediate interim action ensuring that the"combined 
influent ammonia concentrations of the Dye Plant do not 
exceed 1.2 mg/l, or fluctuate by more than 0.2 mg/l within 
a 24-hour period." As best we can tell, these interim 
requirements are lifted from Approach 2 of the SATET 
report. 
 
On September 2, 1999, Grace filed a petition for review in 
this Court challenging the EPA's authority to issue the July 
29 Order pursuant to the emergency provisions of SDWA. 
This first petition has been docketed as Case No. 99-5662. 
 
Grace also filed with the EPA a Draft Interim Measures 
Statement of Work ("draft Statement of Work") on 
September 2, 1999. It outlined a plan to use a blending 
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process to ensure that the influent water entering the Dye 
Plant after being combined from all wells contains ammonia 
below levels mandated by the interim measures 
requirement in the July 29 Order. On September 28, 1999, 
the EPA responded with "draft comments" to Grace's draft 
Statement of Work that rejected Grace's blending approach 
and ordered Grace to ensure that water from each 
production well individually meets the ammonia limitation 
specified in the July 29 Order's interim measures mandate. 
Grace subsequently revised its draft Statement of Work to 
comply with the EPA's comments, but preserved the right to 
challenge this requirement as an unwarranted material 
change of Grace's obligation under the July 29 Order in a 
second petition for review, Case No. 00-3302. 
 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction over Grace's petition for review of 
the July 29 Order pursuant to section 1448(a)(2) of SDWA, 
which provides for judicial review of any final agency action 
by the Administrator of the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. S 300j- 
7(a)(2). The applicable standard of review is whether the 
EPA's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 
U.S.C. S 706(2)(A); see Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. 
Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 1997). In applying this 
standard, our "only task is to determine whether[the EPA] 
considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 
Growth Alliance, 121 F.3d at 111 (alteration in original). 
 
However, we must remand to the EPA if "the record 
before the agency does not support the agency action, if the 
agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the 
reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged 
agency action on the basis of the record before it." C.K. v. 
N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 
U.S. 729, 744 (1985)). Moreover, we may not accept 
appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency 
action. Put another way, an agency's order must be upheld 
on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency 
itself. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 
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U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp. , 332 U.S. 
194, 196 (1947); Furnari v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Corr. 
Inst., 218 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir. 2000); Marshall v. 
Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943-44 (3d Cir. 1988)." `Even if the 
evidence in the record, combined with the reviewing court's 
understanding of the law, is enough to support the order, 
the court may not uphold the order unless it is sustainable 
on the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the 
agency.' " Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989, 992 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Administrative Law Treatise S 14:29 (1980)). Moreover, 
while a decision of less than ideal clarity will be upheld if 
the agency's path may be reasonably discerned, see Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983), we will not search the record to find 
support for the agency's decision unless its "conclusions 
[are] . . . readily apparent" so that "broad inferential leaps 
of logic [are] not needed to reach the determinations." 
Marshall, 839 F.2d at 944; accord Furnari , 218 F.3d at 257. 
 
III. Emergency Power Under SDWA 
 
Section 1431(a) of SDWA authorizes the EPA 
Administrator to take action necessary to protect the 
public's health from an imminent and substantial 
endangerment created by contaminants in a public water 
system or an underground source of drinking water. See 42 
U.S.C. S 300i(a). However, action by the EPA is only 
authorized when state and local authorities have not acted 
first. See id. 
 
The legislative history to section 1431(a) demonstrates 
that Congress intended "to confer completely adequate 
authority to deal promptly and effectively with emergency 
situations which jeopardize the health of persons" using 
public water systems. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6487. Congress 
intended a broad reading of the term "imminent" to allow 
the EPA "the time it may take to prepare administrative 
orders or moving papers, to commence and complete 
litigation, and to permit issuance, notification, 
implementation, and enforcement of administrative or court 
orders to protect the public health." Id. at 6488. Moreover, 
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the EPA may take action to prevent even a risk  of harm to 
a public drinking water system. See id."[F]or example, the 
Administrator may invoke this section when there is an 
imminent likelihood of the introduction into drinking water 
of contaminants that may cause health damage after a 
period of latency." Id. 
 
In United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), we 
addressed the nature of the EPA's emergency authority 
under section 1431 of SDWA and under section 7003 of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 
U.S.C. S 6901 et seq.2 We explained that "[b]y enacting the 
endangerment provisions of RCRA and SDWA, Congress 
sought to invoke the broad and flexible equity powers of the 
federal courts in instances where hazardous wastes 
threatened human health." Price, 688 F.2d at 211. 
Moreover, "these provisions have enhanced the courts' 
traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issuance of 
injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more 
lenient standard than the traditional requirement of 
threatened irreparable harm." Id.; see also Trinity Am. Corp. 
v. EPA, 150 F.3d 389, 399 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that 
section 1431 is applicable when the EPA demonstrates an 
imminent "risk of harm"); United States v. Waste Indus., 
Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that 
section 7003 is not specifically limited to addressing an 
"emergency"). Thus, it is well established from the 
legislative history and case law that SDWA confers on the 
EPA broad authority to address present and future harm 
that may substantially threaten the health of persons who 
use public water systems. 
 
Yet, the EPA's emergency power is not without limitation. 
The same House Report that expresses an intent to confer 
broad emergency authority on the EPA also explains that, 
"[i]n using the words `imminent and substantial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Using language similar to that found in SDWA, section 7003 of RCRA 
authorizes the Federal Government to bring suit"to restrain" certain 
activities, "or to take such other action as may be necessary," when 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of hazardous 
waste "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. S 6973. 
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endangerment to the health of persons,' the Committee 
intends that this broad administrative authority not be 
used when the system of regulatory authorities provided 
elsewhere in the bill could be used adequately to protect 
the public health." H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185 (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6487-88. "Nor is the emergency 
authority to be used in cases where the risk of harm is 
remote in time, completely speculative in nature, or de 
minimis in degree." Id. at 6488. 
 
In Price, we also noted limitations on the EPA's power to 
act. Price, 688 F.2d at 214. We observed that, under section 
7003 of RCRA, the EPA may "authorize[ ] the cleanup of a 
site, even a dormant one, if that action is necessary to 
abate a present threat to the public health or the 
environment[,]" but that it "could not order the cleanup of 
a waste disposal site which posed no threat to health or the 
environment." Id. Because the "authority conferred . . . by 
section 1431 of SDWA is quite as broad as that conferred 
by RCRA," id., we believe the limitations under the latter 
provision are equally applicable to the former. As is the 
case with RCRA, the EPA cannot order cleanup under 
section 1431 of SDWA when there is no threat to the 
public's health. 
 
IV. Application of Law to this Case 
 
In applying the requirements of SDWA to the facts of this 
case, we find that the EPA's July 29 Order falls short of the 
mark. More specifically, the EPA has failed to provide (A) a 
rational basis for its determination that a cleanup standard 
of 1.2 mg/l is necessary to protect the health of persons 
who may use Lansing's public drinking water system, and 
(B) a rational basis for its finding that remediation of the 
aquifer through Approach 1 is necessary to protect the 
health of those persons.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have carefully considered whether the EPA would ever have the 
authority to order long-term remediation of an aquifer pursuant to 
section 1431 of SDWA when alternative interim measures are sufficient 
to abate the immediate threat to the public. While there exists 
substantial support for the view that, under those circumstances, the 
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A. The Ammonia Standard (1.2 mg/l) 
 
The July 29 Order mandates a reduction of ammonia 
levels to 1.2 mg/l, but fails to provide a rational 
explanation for why the EPA settled on this standard. In 
support of the 1.2 mg/l standard, that Order makes the 
following findings of fact: 
 
       SATET conducted a technical study of the Dye WCP in 
       order to determine how much influent ammonia, as 
       nitrogen, the Dye WCP could handle and still maintain 
       adequate protection of human health and comply with 
       current and future drinking water regulations. SATET 
       concluded that the maximum amount of influent 
       ammonia, as nitrogen, that the Dye WCP can handle 
       and still adequately protect human health, as well as 
       comply with current and future drinking water 
       regulations, is 1.2 milligrams per liter (mg/l), as 
       nitrogen. 
 
Our colleague in dissent appears to accept these findings of 
fact on face value when she states, for example, that "[t]he 
Technical Evaluation Team concluded that the maximum 
amount of influent ammonia, as nitrogen, that the Dye 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
EPA should order only interim measures under SDWA and pursue long- 
term remediation pursuant to CERCLA, we do not decide this issue here. 
Instead, we vacate the EPA's July 29 Order only on the narrower 
grounds noted above. 
 
We have also considered whether the July 29 Order makes a sufficient 
finding of "imminent and substantial endangerment." The EPA states in 
a conclusory fashion at the outset of the July 29 Order -- but not under 
its formal Findings of Fact -- that ammonia in the Saginaw aquifer "may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons receiving drinking water from the Lansing Board of Water and 
Light." Although we do not limit our review to the EPA's formal Findings 
of Fact in this case, we caution that ordinarily we"may not uphold the 
order unless it is sustainable on the agency's findings," Moret, 746 F.2d 
at 992, and that for the sake of clarity it would be better advised to 
make a finding of "imminent and substantial endangerment" under its 
formally articulated Findings of Fact. We also caution the EPA not to 
assume that the inclusion of these "magic words," without any support 
in the record to demonstrate that the finding is not arbitrary and 
capricious, will be sufficient to sustain an order under SDWA. 
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Water conditioning plant can handle and still adequately 
protect human health, as well as comply with current and 
future drinking water regulations, is 1.2 milligrams per 
liter, as nitrogen." However, for the reasons explained 
below, we believe this statement mischaracterizes the 
record. 
 
An examination of the SATET report reveals no technical 
study by SATET to determine the maximum level of 
ammonia the Dye Plant could handle without jeopardizing 
the public's health. In fact, the 1.2 mg/l standard appears 
to have been expressed as an unquestioned baseline in 
SATET's mission statement regarding Approach 2. 
 
At oral argument, the EPA referred us to section 3.1 of 
the SATET report for the technical study allegedly 
performed by SATET. Our best guess is that the EPA was 
referring to the following passage: 
 
       The SATET met in Lansing on April 8, 15, and 29, 
       1999. A technical workshop meeting which included 
       the SATET and an additional technical representative 
       from W.R. Grace & Co. was held in Lansing on May 5, 
       1999. In each of the meetings the SATET endeavored to 
       understand the data available, recommend additional 
       data collection needed, and discuss the alternative 
       ways the mission could be met. 
 
This passage in no way explains how or why SATET settled 
on a 1.2 mg/l ammonia standard. It certainly cannot 
support the finding in the July 29 Order that "SATET 
conducted a technical study of the Dye WCP in order to 
determine how much influent ammonia, as nitrogen, the 
Dye WCP could handle and still maintain adequate 
protection of human health and comply with current and 
future drinking water regulations." 
 
The EPA has also directed our attention to section 4.1 of 
the SATET report as support for the 1.2 mg/l ammonia 
standard. Section 4.1 states as follows: 
 
       The goal of Approach 2 is to minimize the ammonia 
       concentration at the Dye Water Conditioning Plant 
       (WCP) to approximately 1.0 mg/l (plus or minus 
       approximately 0.2 mg/l), including measures arising 
 
                                15 
  
       from Approach 1. Approach 2 may also include a well 
       field management program, including routine 
       monitoring and characterization of the water produced 
       from specific Lansing Board of Water & Light (LBW&L) 
       wells. The water treatment target has been identified as 
       a maximum ammonia concentration of 1.0 mg/l plus 
       or minus 0.2 mg/l. An incoming ammonia 
       concentration no greater than 1.0 mg/l will ensure that 
       the plant can meet the maximum disinfectant residual 
       levels required for chloramines. Spikes in influent 
       ammonia concentration should be limited to 0.2 mg/l, 
       an increase that can easily be handled by the plant 
       based on existing fluctuations in ammonia 
       concentrations. 
 
Despite the EPA's suggestion to the contrary, this passage 
fails to provide support for its conclusion that a 1.2 mg/l 
standard would be necessary to protect the Lansing 
public's health. SATET's finding that an incoming ammonia 
concentration no greater than 1.0 mg/l "will ensure that 
the plant can meet its disinfectant levels" is not a finding 
that no greater ammonia concentration can be tolerated by 
the Dye Plant without endangering the public's health. 
Likewise, SATET's conclusory finding that the Dye Plant 
can "easily handle" spikes limited to 0.2 mg/l in no way 
determines whether the Dye Plant could handle spikes 
greater than 0.2 mg/l. Section 4.1 therefore fails to 
demonstrate a rational basis for settling on the 1.2 mg/l 
standard. 
 
With no evidence that a technical study was ever 
performed by SATET or the EPA to determine the 
appropriate ammonia standard necessary to protect the 
public's health, and no other explanation in the July 29 
Order for the EPA's decision, we have no choice but to 
conclude that the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously settled 
on the 1.2 mg/l standard.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are aware that the EPA and SATET had before them a desktop 
study by a consultant hired by the Lansing Board that concludes that 
ammonia concentrations over existing background levels (0.1-0.5 mg/l) 
would affect the current treatment and operational practices at the Dye 
Plant. However, for the following reasons we conclude that this report 
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B. Remediation of the Saginaw Aquifer Through 
       Approach 1 
 
The EPA has also failed to articulate a rational basis for 
its conclusion that Approach 1 is necessary to protect the 
health of the Lansing public. The July 29 Order's only 
finding of fact in support of remediation of the Saginaw 
aquifer as provided in Approach 1 states: 
 
       SATET also concluded that the MWDS [Motor Wheel 
       Disposal Site] ammonia contamination in the Saginaw 
       aquifer will cause the Dye WCP to experience influent 
       ammonia concentrations above 1.2 mg/l, which will 
       compromise the WCP's ability to protect human health 
       and comply with current and future drinking water 
       regulations. The SATET concluded that the only way to 
       avoid this risk was through the removal of excess 
       ammonia from the Saginaw aquifer. 
 
Unfortunately, it is hardly clear from SATET's report that 
the only way to protect the public's health is through the 
removal of excess ammonia. Rather, it appears that there 
was sharp disagreement among the members of SATET as 
to whether this form of remediation would be necessary. On 
appeal, the EPA refers us to the following passage in the 
Executive Summary of SATET's final report: 
 
       The ultimate resolution of the Cooperating Parties['] 
       concerns regarding the Saginaw Aquifer and LBW&L 
       operations lies in remediation of the Saginaw Aquifer. 
       While aquifer remediation is proceeding, in the short 
       term, other options can be considered to protect the 
       LBW&L capability to produce safe water in sufficient 
       quantity for its customers. This is the thrust of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
does not provide a rational basis for the July 29 Order. First, neither 
the 
July 29 Order nor SATET's final report purports to rely upon the 
recommendation in that report. Second, the report provides no technical 
data or research demonstrating that ammonia must be kept at those 
background levels to protect the Lansing public's health. Finally, the 
report provides no rational explanation for the EPA's decision to settle 
on 
a 1.2 mg/l standard. Indeed, if the report is accurate, the EPA should 
have ordered a 0.5 mg/l standard in its July 29 Order (as it did in its 
first order issued on February 26, 1999). 
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       Approaches 2, 3, and 4. Each of these approaches 
       would be supplements to the treatment options 
       discussed in Approach 1. 
 
The fact that the ultimate resolution of the parties' 
differences lies in a recommendation for Approach 1 does 
not mean that Approach 1 is "the only way" to protect the 
Lansing public's health as the EPA's July 29 Order 
maintains. 
 
Morever, we need more than a conclusory statement from 
SATET to determine that the EPA did not arbitrarily and 
capriciously settle on Approach 1 as the only method 
sufficient to protect the public health. In the draft report, 
SATET's discussion of Approach 1 ended with a 
recommendation for a program of data collection (including 
new monitoring wells) and groundwater modeling to be 
conducted with the goal of confirming capture of the 
ammonia plume. If capture could not be confirmed, the 
draft report continued, the data would be used to decide 
where additional extraction wells would be needed. 
 
In its discussion of Approach 2, SATET's draft report 
stated that mothballing of selected wells combined with a 
well-replacement strategy could be an effective method to 
protect the Lansing public's health. It explained that 
mothballing the wells with elevated ammonia levels would 
remove them from the well sequence and any effect on the 
water supply. The report also stated that well-replacement 
would prevent contaminants from migrating to the next tier 
of wells in the field when mothballed wells were shut down. 
 
On May 21, 1999, SATET issued its final report 
recommending that long-term remediation under Approach 
1 be adopted to protect the Dye Plant. It recommended 
using Approaches 2, 3, and 4 only as supplements to 
Approach 1. Yet the final report provided no rational 
explanation for recommending remediation of the Saginaw 
aquifer under Approach 1 when SATET had previously 
concluded that a combined mothballing and well- 
replacement strategy under Approach 2 would be an 
effective method for keeping ammonia concentrations below 
1.0 mg/l (plus/minus 0.2 mg/l). 
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The discussion of Approaches 1 and 2 in the final report 
remained largely the same as in the draft report except for 
two conclusory statements concerning Approach 2. The first 
was that, "[i]n order to avoid . . . complicated control 
requirements [under Approach 2], cleanup of[the] aquifer 
[under Approach 1] is essential." The second stated that 
"[r]emoval of ammonia from the well field before it impacts 
any production wells, as discussed in Approach 1, may be 
preferable to the complex operational changes required to 
manage incoming ammonia concentrations [under 
Approach 2]." SATET provided no reasons for reaching 
these conclusions in the final report that were not made in 
the draft report, and we can find no additional findings of 
fact to back up this change in course. Moreover, we note 
that the "complicated control requirements" and "complex 
operational changes" referred to are problems the draft 
SATET report attributed to the blending technique under 
Approach 2. SATET's final report failed to explain how the 
problems associated with blending would undermine the 
value of the mothballing/well-replacement technique that 
the draft report previously recommended as an effective 
solution. If mothballing and well-replacement under 
Approach 2 would be effective, it can hardly be said that 
removal as provided in Approach 1 is essential. 
 
The only explanation for SATET's change in 
recommendation between the draft and final report appears 
to be the Lansing Board's opposition to anything other than 
Approach 1. In its discussion of Approach 2, the final 
report explains that a blending approach "would allow 
contaminants to enter a drinking water system." The very 
next sentence explains that "[d]uring SATET meetings, 
LBW&L staff stated that the knowing acceptance of 
contaminants, however diluted, in the drinking water 
transmission system, would be unacceptable, and would 
not be recommended to LBW&L top management or Board 
of Commissioners." The inference is that the Lansing 
Board's staff pushed SATET not to recommend a blending 
process under Approach 2 because blending would allow 
some contaminants to enter the drinking water system. 
 
The Lansing Board's staff also stated at SATET meetings 
that Approaches 3 and 4 "will likely not be acceptable to 
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the LBW&L for reasons such as adverse public perceptions 
about the quality of source water, the precedent of use of 
formerly contaminated water for drinking water supply, and 
the precedent of using drinking water supply wells as 
pollutant extraction wells." They explained, however, that 
"mothballing with replacement wells, in conjunction with 
Approach 1 (plume containment and capture and treatment 
of contaminated water from extraction wells) would likely be 
recommended to LBW&L top management and Board of 
Commissioners." Not surprisingly, the final report 
recommends complete remediation under Approach 1 as 
the "ultimate resolution of the Cooperating Parties['] 
concerns regarding the Saginaw acquifer and LBW&L 
operations." The report recommends Approaches 2, 3, and 
4 only as "supplements to the treatment options discussed 
in Approach 1." 
 
We are left with the firm impression that SATET's 
support for Approach 1 in the final report is primarily 
based on the Lansing Board's opposition to any of the other 
approaches. Such a recommendation is not rationally based 
on the facts SATET found concerning ammonia 
contamination in the Saginaw aquifer and the availability of 
remedies to protect the public's health. We therefore vacate 
the July 29 Order because it fails to provide a rational 
explanation for concluding that remediation of the Saginaw 
aquifer through Approach 1 is necessary to protect the 
Lansing public's health.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Grace has argued that SATET changed its recommendation in the final 
report in response to pressure from the Safe Drinking Water Branch of 
the EPA. It appears that the Chief of the Safe Drinking Water Branch, 
Charlene J. Denys, sent an e-mail to her staff on May 12, 1999 
expressing concern that the SATET group was concentrating more on the 
short-term capacity/treatment of the Lansing public water system as 
opposed to the long-term remediation of the Saginaw aquifer. She 
indicated that she would expect any proposal from SATET to include the 
long-term remediation of the Saginaw aquifer in addition to the short- 
term capacity issue and the effect of ammonia on the Dye Plant and its 
distribution system. We note, however, that the Denys e-mail was sent 
prior to SATET's completion of even the draft  report. We therefore cannot 
be certain that SATET's change in recommendation between the draft 
report and the final report was influenced by her e-mail. Instead we 
observe that SATET's final report itself does not provide a rational 
explanation for its change in recommendation and conclude that the 
EPA's decision in reliance upon that report is therefore arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 




For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the EPA's 
July 29 Order as arbitrary and capricious. In so doing, we 
need not reach the following issues raised by Grace: (1) 
whether the EPA erroneously failed to consider the ability of 
local authorities to take action to protect the public health; 
(2) whether the EPA improperly relied upon the 1996 
Source Water Assessment Amendment to SDWA for 
authority to issue the July 29 Order; and (3) whether the 
EPA's interpretation of SDWA to authorize long-term 
cleanup is unconstitutional because it denies Grace a full 
and fair opportunity to challenge the EPA's post-issuance 
amendments to the July 29 Order. Moreover, because we 
are vacating the July 29 Order, we need not address issues 
raised in Grace's second petition, Case No. 00-3302, 
challenging requirements imposed by the EPA when 
approving Grace's Statement of Work submitted under that 
Order. The second petition is therefore denied as moot. 
 




I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because 
I would hold that the EPA's July 29 Order, though perhaps 
suffering from poor draftsmanship, nonetheless passably 
fulfills the requirements of the SDWA. I do not disagree 
with the majority opinion's presentation of the law 
proscribing the EPA's power to order cleanup under section 
1431 when there is not any threat to the public's health. I 
would emphasize, however, the highly deferential standard 
of review in this case. The high degree of deference we are 
to accord the EPA is a cornerstone to the EPA's power, 
enshrined in the SDWA, "to protect the public, health, the 
environment, and public water supplies from the pernicious 
effects of toxic wastes." United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 
204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982). Consequently, I have resolved that 
the EPA's actions here were neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, and that the EPA satisfactorily demonstrated 
that the ammonia contamination in the Saginaw aquifer 
endangers the public's health. 
 
As the majority explains, a court must uphold any EPA 
actions taken pursuant to the Act unless the action is 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). This 
standard of review presumes the validity of agency action. 
Frisby v. HUD, 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985); Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Dir. 1976)."The ultimate 
standard is a narrow one," under which the court is not "to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
Our sole task in reviewing the EPA action, as the majority 
points out, "is to determine whether [the EPA] considered 
the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made." 
Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 
106, 111 (3d Cir. 1997)(quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Coun., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983). Unlike 
the majority, however, I am satisfied that the EPA 
considered the relevant factors and articulated a basic 
rational connection. 
 
I am particularly mindful that we are a reviewing court, 
experts in the law, and not expert environmental 
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toxicologists examining data ab initio. All the more reason 
to apply the presumption of correctness to the EPA."A 
reviewing court `must generally be at its most deferential' 
when reviewing factual determinations within an agency's 
area of special expertise." Southwestern Pa. Growth 
Alliance, 121 F.3d at 117 (internal citation omitted). An 
agency's evaluation of specific evidence forming the basis of 
its decision is "entitled to respectful consideration" by the 
reviewing court. Tri-Bio Labs v. United States , 836 F.2d 
135, 142 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, where the agency decision 
turns on issues requiring the exercise of scientific 
judgment, as it does here, the court "must look at the 
decision not as a chemist, biologist or statistician that we 
are qualified neither by training, nor experience to be, but 
as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty of 
holding agencies to certain minimal standards of 
rationality." Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 36-37. 
 
I would uphold the agency action here because I would 
find that the EPA's actions, in accordance with a complex 
statute are sufficiently rational so as to preclude us from 
substituting our judgment for that of the EPA.1 See e.g. 
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Council , 470 
U.S. 116, 125 (1985). I agree with the EPA that the SATET 
report2 provides sufficient support for the EPA's findings 
that a cleanup standard of 1.2 mg/l is necessary to protect 
the health of persons who may use that drinking water 
system, and that remediation of the aquifer through 
Approach 1 is necessary to protect the health of those 
persons. This would remain my position even if some other 
figure or another approach were ultimately shown to 
adequately protect the public drinking water. 
 
The evidence shows the following regarding the SATET 
investigation and report. In March 1999, Grace agreed to 
participate in a technical evaluation review committee to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority states that we accept the finding of 1.2 miligrams per 
liter "on face value." Instead, we accept this finding because we conclude 
that it is rationally based. 
 
2. Grace's active participation in SATET is conspicuous, though I 
hesitate to suggest that Grace has in any way waived its right to protest 
the SATET report. 
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identify and evaluate options to protect the Saginaw 
aquifer. Accordingly, Grace formed SATET. SATET meetings 
were attended by representatives of Grace, the EPA, 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and 
Lansing Water. SATET conducted a technical study of the 
Dye Water conditioning plant in order to determine how 
much influent ammonia, as nitrogen, the Dye Water 
conditioning plant could handle and still maintain adequate 
protection of human health and comply with current and 
future drinking water regulations. The Technical Evaluation 
Team concluded that the maximum amount of influent 
ammonia, as nitrogen, that the Dye Water conditioning 
plant can handle and still adequately protect human 
health, as well as comply with current and future drinking 
water regulations, is 1.2 milligrams per liter, as nitrogen. 
 
SATET also concluded that the Disposal Site ammonia 
contamination in the Saginaw aquifer will cause the Dye 
Water conditioning plant to experience influent ammonia 
concentrations above 1.2 mg/l, which will compromise the 
Water Conditioning Plant's ability to protect human health 
and comply with current and future drinking water 
regulations. SATET concluded that the only way to avoid 
this risk was through the removal of excess ammonia from 
the Saginaw aquifer. 
 
On April 12, 1999, the EPA withdrew an emergency 
administrative order under Section 1431 of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act that it had issued to Grace on February 
26, 1999. The EPA withdrew the Order because Grace 
agreed to form SATET. On May 26, 1999, SATET sent to the 
EPA and to Grace specific findings and recommendations 
concerning both the remediation of the Saginaw aquifer and 
the protection of Lansing Water's Dye Water Conditioning 
Plant. The EPA then re-issued an emergency administrative 
order under Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
based upon SATET's findings and recommendations. 
 
With respect to the technical study of Lansing Water's 
Dye Water Conditioning Plant, in a relatively short period of 
time, SATET examined and reviewed a substantial corpus 
of information concerning the ammonia problem. As the 
SATET report states, "The SATET met in Lansing on April 
8, 15, and 29, 1999. A technical workshop meeting which 
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included the SATET and an additional technical 
representative from W.R. Grace & Co. was held in Lansing 
on May 5, 1999. In each of the meetings the SATET 
endeavored to understand the data available, recommend 
additional data . . . needed, and discuss alternative ways 
the mission could be met." Moreover, "[t]o develop an 
understanding of Dye [plant] operations, the SATET 
received briefings from Dye [plant] engineering personnel. 
Key information gained through these briefings included an 
understanding of the order of operation of the [Dye plant] 
wells." 
 
Specifically regarding the amount of ammonia that the 
plant could safely tolerate, the report states:"An incoming 
ammonia concentration no greater than 1.0 mg/l will 
ensure that the plant can meet the maximum disinfectant 
residual levels required for chloramines. Spikes in influent 
ammonia concentration should be limited to 0.2 mg/l, an 
increase that can easily be handled by the plant based on 
existing fluctuations in ammonia concentrations." The 
report concluded that the Dye plant could handle 1.2 mg/l 
of ammonia and still provide safe drinking water in 
sufficient quantities to its customers. Similarly, with 
respect to the adoption of the plan to remove excess 
ammonia from the Saginaw aquifer, the SATET report 
states that "[t]he ultimate resolution of the Cooperating 
Parties [sic] concerns regarding the Saginaw aquifer and 
[Dye plant] operations lies in the remediation of the 
Saginaw Aquifer." Although this standard may have been 
reached by virtue of a compromise, it is nonetheless valid 
for the EPA, using its expertise and experience, to set forth 
a standard which is generally supported but does not have 
a specific and identical source in the record. 
 
I agree with the majority that "for the sake of clarity [the 
EPA] would be better advised to make a finding of 
`imminent and substantial endangerment' under its 
formally articulated findings of fact." The SDWA's plain 
language reads that the Administrator may act "upon 
receipt of information that . . . an underground source of 
drinking water may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the health of persons." 42 U. S. C. S 300i. 
This language is mirrored in the EPA order. Moreover, when 
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faced with a problem of statutory construction, we are 
bound as a federal court to show "great deference to the 
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency 
charged with its administration." EPA v. National Crushed 
Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) (quoting Udall v. 
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)). "[I]f the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute." Chemical Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 
(1985). To uphold an agency interpretation, a court need 
only find that the agency's understanding of a complex 
statute "is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court 
from substituting its judgment for that of [the agency]." Id. 
Permitting the EPA the understanding that it may include 
the phrase "may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the health of persons" where it did within 
the order is surely rational, though with good reason, we 
may prefer other placement. 
 
As we have held previously, in enacting the 
endangerment provisions of the SDWA, 
 
       Congress . . . sought to invoke nothing less than the full 
       equity powers of the federal courts in the effort to 
       protect public health, the environment, and public water 
       supplies from the pernicious effects of toxic wastes. 
       Courts should not undermine the will of Congress by 
       either withholding relief or granting it grudgingly.  
 
United States v. Price, 688 F.2d at 214. (emphasis added).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Just three years ago, the Fourth Circuit, deciding a case, Trinity 
American v. U.S. EPA, 150 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 1998), under the same 
provision of the SDWA, held similarly: 
 
       So that EPA can act promptly and effectively when a threat to 
public 
       health is imminent, courts must ensure that the agency's power 
       under the Act remains "relatively untrammeled." 
 
Id. at 395 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit is also in accord. See 
United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 989 (2d 
Cir. 1984). 
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